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Abstract 
Online labor markets gain momentum: Frequently, requesters post micro-tasks and workers choose 
which tasks to complete for a payment. In virtual, short-lived, and commonly one-shot labor relations, 
one challenge is to properly incentivize worker effort and quality of work. We present a real effort 
experiment on a crowd work platform studying the effect of feedback on worker performance. Rank 
order tournaments might or might not disclose a worker’s current competitive position. One might 
expect that feedback on the competitive position spurs competition and, in effect, effort and 
performance. On the contrary, we find evidence that in rank order tournaments, performance feedback 
tends to have a negative impact on workers’ performance. This effect is mediated by task completion. 
Furthermore when playing against strong competitors, feedback makes workers more likely to quit the 
task altogether and, thus, show lower performance. When the competitors are weak, workers tend to 
complete the task but with reduced effort. Thus, providing performance feedback might not be 
advisable in crowd labor markets. 
Keywords: Crowdsourcing, Online Labor, Performance Feedback, Rank Order Tournament, Real 
Effort Experiment. 
1 Introduction 
Paid crowd work offers remarkable opportunities for distributed work and improving productivity. 
Moreover it enables a distributed workforce to complete complex tasks on demand and at scale. 
Crowd work today spans a wide range of skill and pay levels, with commercial vendors (e.g., Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk for short), oDesk, Clickworker) providing access to a range of workers and 
focused support for various tasks. These tasks range from simple repetitive e-mail tagging to creative 
and complex tasks such as building logos or websites (cf. Kittur et al., 2012, 2013).  
In virtual, short-lived and commonly one-shot labor relations, one challenge is to properly incentivize 
worker effort and quality of work. Quality control is frequently done through repetition of work and 
managing an individual worker pool (Ipeirotis et al., 2010; Kokkodis and Ipeirotis, 2013; Wang et al., 
2013). Incentives typically comprise the payment of a flat fee when the work is acceptable and an 
additional bonus when the work is very high quality. This raises the question of how incentive 
schemes can be designed to motivate workers to provide their best effort and deliver high task 
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performance. Rank order systems are pretty common in work places (Microsoft, GE, Yahoo! etc.) and 
in competitive environments (Poker, soccer leagues etc.) suggesting that they indeed induce the spirit 
to deliver higher performance. Hence, it seems reasonable to transfer this common incentive design to 
crowd work. The research question we explore in this paper is how performance feedback in rank 
order tournaments (ROTs) among workers affect their effort and task performance. 
In this paper we report a real effort experiment on MTurk studying the effect of performance feedback 
on worker effort in ROTs. In ROTs, on average there is no difference whether feedback is shown or 
not. In a nutshell, the root for this unintuitive result is participant heterogeneity. While low performers 
stop working all together, high performers knowing that they will be rewarded work less. 
2 Background and Research Model 
2.1 Crowd Work  
Crowdsourcing and online labor markets have emerged as new labor pools of freelancers that allow 
organizations to flexibly scale their workforce and hire experts. Today, MTurk dominates the market 
for crowdsourcing micro-tasks that are trivial to humans but challenging to computers (Ipeirotis, 
2010). Examples include tagging images, transcribing audio recordings, verifying addresses and phone 
numbers. More sophisticated work like software development, design, and innovation contests is 
performed in online labor marketplaces like oDesk, Clickworker, and Innocentive. Recently, online 
labor markets (especially MTurk) gained widespread interest as a platform to run low cost experiments 
with subjects from a demographically diverse pool. Previous work has examined its validity, costs 
(e.g. Chilton et al., 2010), and participant demographics (Paolacci et al., 2010; Berinsky et al., 2012). 
See e.g. Mason and Suri (2012), Horton et al. (2011), Kaufmann et al. (2011), Pilz and Gewald (2013), 
and Teschner and Gimpel (2013a, b) for recent examples. 
Two of the main issues with crowd work are (1) how to secure quality and (2) incentivize workers to 
give their best (e.g. Wang and Ipeirotis, 2013; Shaw et al., 2011). Manual verification of work quality 
is typically not feasible. Thus, some malicious workers take advantage of the system by quickly 
submitting low quality work (Ipeirotis et al., 2010). To compensate for low quality work one of the 
main strategies used is repetition of work. This is, however, costly. Kokkodis and Ipeirotis (2013) 
show evidence that it is possible to predict a workers performance by categorizing tasks and using 
feedback. An even stricter approach applied by some requesters is to build one’s own trusted 
workforce with workers who delivered high-quality work in previous requests. Shaw et al. (2011) 
show that using a combination of social and monetary incentives leads to better quality. Furthermore, 
pure monetary incentives, such as tournaments, lead to higher performance, but were not significantly 
different from control conditions. This raises the demand of further investigation. Paolacci et al. 
(2010) report that compared to laboratories, crowdsourcing needs rather small monetary incentives to 
get comparable results. This indicates that a good selection of incentives fosters quality in 
crowdsourcing settings. Contrary, Mason and Watts (2009) find that more money leads to more effort, 
but quality stays the same. Furthermore, they find that a quota pay scheme, which only pays for a set 
of completed tasks, leads to a greater output than a piece rate (pay every task) even though the quota 
payment was smaller. To sum up, it is an open debate which incentive and information structures are 
best suited to stimulate worker performance and quality output. 
2.2 Rank Order Tournaments 
A rank order tournament (ROT) is a setting in which two or more people are ranked according to their 
performance. Only the top performers win the tournament. Such settings are usually used in sports but 
as well in some crowdsourcing platforms such as 99designs and by some requesters on MTurk. 
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Bull et al. (1987) compared effort levels under a piece rate payment scheme and a ROT payment 
scheme. Their findings show that the average effort levels form a Nash equilibrium, but have a higher 
variance in ROTs. Similarly, Van Dijk et al. (2001) report that effort levels and variance in 
tournaments are higher compared to a piece rate. Furthermore, workers with a low ability work harder. 
These results suggest two hypotheses: First, in a tournament some subjects lose interest if they are far 
behind and have no chance of winning anymore. Others who are far in front might relax. And some 
who are close to each other might actually be competing. Second, the variance in ROTs might be 
induced by risk-aversion. Eriksson et al. (2009a) present experimental evidence that when subjects can 
choose between ROTs and piece rates, variance decreases and effort levels increase in tournaments. 
They further find that risk-averse subjects tend to choose a piece rate scheme. This suggests that some 
people are more motivated by tournaments than others. 
Eriksson et al. (2009b) experimentally study the influence of feedback on subjects’ effort with piece 
rate payments and ROTs. Each of these is played with three different feedback rules on relative 
performance. No feedback, feedback given half way through the experiment, and a continuously 
updated feedback. They find that on average feedback does not change effort. Furthermore, subjects 
who are behind make more mistakes under continuous feedback. Interestingly subjects who are behind 
almost never drop out of the tournament. Eriksson et al. (2009b) argue that the reason could be a social 
norm to never give up. This effect might, however, be stronger in a laboratory setting than an 
anonymous crowd labor market. Evidence in this direction is presented by Fershtman and Gneezy 
(2011): While quitting is often socially stigmatized and subjects often try to avoid it, they find that 
higher rewards lead subjects to exert more effort, but a higher rate of quitting is observed as well. 
Finally, Pull et al. (2013) show that in dyadic tournaments where the ability of subjects is 
heterogeneous, effort levels decrease, because both know that one will win anyway. While when the 
subjects’ abilities are homogeneous, the effort levels will be much higher. In consequence we imply 
that a live or continuous feedback will inform the subjects about their heterogeneity or homogeneity 
and will lead to the same effect. Furthermore, if participants get feedback and performed better than 
expected, they decrease their effort but expect to be better in the future (Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012). 
On the other hand, people who performed worse than their expectations will increase their effort but 
reduce their expectations. This implies that showing feedback suggesting that they will lose might 
improve their performance while feedback that they are winning might lower performance. 
2.3 Motivation 
A further point which is affected is the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of participants. Intrinsic 
motivation refers to doing something because one wants to do it out of pure interest or fun, while 
extrinsic motivation refers to the motivation of doing something out of external reasons like getting a 
reward (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Eccles and Wigfield, 2002). In this study we clearly affect extrinsic 
motivation by using monetary incentives for performing well. We cannot completely exclude that 
some participants are intrinsically motivated. In settings like MTurk the main motivation for workers 
is to earn money. Therefore workers are mainly externally motivated. By using a real effort task, 
which from design has no overall epic meaning, is boring, and does not improve major skills of a 
person, we tried to exclude intrinsic motivations like altruism, entertainment, and personal 
development as much as possible. Furthermore Deci et al. (1981) argue that competition decreases 
intrinsic motivation. More accurately competitive situations where participants feel a pressure to win 
undermine intrinsic motivation (Reeve and Deci, 1996).  
2.4 Research Model 
Figure 1 summarizes our research model based on the related work reviewed above: Following the 
sequential distinction of service quality in structure, process, and outcome (Donabedian, 1980, 2003), 
a worker’s performance is considered as outcome and is hypothesized to by influenced by the work 
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process and structures. Structural antecedents are classified as individual, crowd, or system level. We 
believe this structure will prove useful for more extensive conceptualization on the interrelation of 
crowd labor incentives and quality. Evaluating this belief is future work; here the generic structure is 
used as frame for a specific causal moderated mediation model.  
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized moderated mediation model on the determinants of worker performance 
in rank order tournaments  
Performance is directly affected by the worker’s capability, i.e. his ability to perform the specific task. 
Capability has a positive effect on performance. Performance might be affected by the competitors’ 
strength. Only when feedback on the performance and current standing in a ROT is provided, since it 
can only be seen by a worker in these cases (cf. Eriksson et al., 2009b). Therefore the effect is 
moderated by feedback. Given evidence from experiments on ROTs, the direction of the moderated 
effect of the competitors’ strength on performance is, however, not ex-ante clear. Task completion 
indicates if a worker finished the task or not. In other words, quitting the task is measured. Following 
prior evidence and common sense, we assume a strong positive effect on performance. We 
hypothesize that task completion is mediating the effects of capability and competitors’ strength on 
performance. When a worker has the necessary ability to do the task, he is more likely to finish it. 
Strength of competitors should have a negative effect on task completion: Similar to the findings of 
Fershtman and Gneezy (2011), knowing that one is falling behind leads to higher rates of quitting. 
Therefore the stronger the competitor is, the more likely one will quit the task. Feedback is 
hypothesized to moderate the effect of strength of competitors on both task completion and 
performance. Only when feedback is given the competitors’ strength can be seen and the effects can 
appear. When competitors are strong, i.e. when a worker faces one or multiple strong competitors, the 
negative effect of competitors’ strength on task completion can be expected to show more strongly 
than when a worker’s competitors are weak. For strong competitors, we hypothesize the effect on 
performance to be positive while we expect it to be negative for weak competitors. In other words: 
When a worker sees that he is falling behind but does not quit the task, the feedback is expected to 
increase performance. When he is ahead, he might relax. 
Tournaments might be a fruitful incentive for crowdsourcing settings, but likewise may not work, 
because crowd workers are used to work under piece rates conditions. Given the partially inconclusive 
theoretical and empirical evidence related to the hypothesized model, we test it experimentally to 
evaluate the existence and direction of hypothesized effect in the context of crowd labor markets. 
3 Experiment Design and Procedures 
The experiment was conducted via MTurk. We followed standard procedures for experimental 
research. The experiments were conducted with a custom-made web application. From a technical 
perspective we followed the guidelines of Mao et al. (2012) and Mason and Suri (2012). To measure 
worker performance, we implemented a real effort task similar to the slider task by Gill and Prowse 
(2012): workers see a slider ranging from 0 to 100 and have to set it to 50. This is repeated over and 
over until either the time for the task elapses or workers quit. The rather simple, needless work is by 
purpose and typical for real effort experiments. The intention is typically to measure workers reaction 
Capability
Strength of 
Competitors
Feedback
Task Completion
Performance
H1: +
H2: +
H3: +
Structure Process Outcome
Individual
Crowd
System
H4:-
H5: +/-
H6:+
H7: +
Straub, Gimpel, Teschner, Weinhardt / Feedback and Performance in Crowd Work 
 
 
Twenty Second European Conference on Information Systems, Tel Aviv 2014                        5 
 
 
to incentives, feedback, and competition, with a simple task that is easy to understand and depends as 
little as possible on pre-existing knowledge, learning effects, randomness, or guessing (Gill and 
Prowse, 2012). Furthermore it partially excludes intrinsic motivational factors as already discussed 
above. The number of sliders a worker correctly sets to 50 prior to the end of the task is the measure of 
performance. The slider task was originally developed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We 
implemented a similar version in JavaScript, since the experiment should be accessible online through 
MTurk. In addition, we added an out button, to quit the task whenever the workers wanted to. This 
was used as measure for the binary variable task completion (1 = completed, 0 otherwise). The explicit 
option to quit the task was intended to reduce experimenter demand effects and the relevance of a 
potential social norm to never give up. 
Subjects were recruited from the general pool of MTurk workers with restrictions that workers reside 
in the US, completed at least 1,000 tasks on MTurk, and had a task approval rate of at least 95%. Upon 
agreeing to participate in the experiment, workers received instructions and had to complete a brief 
quiz testing their understanding. They then worked on the slider task for 1.5 minutes with piece rate 
payment of USD 0.01 per finished slider. The number of finished sliders under this piece rate is taken 
as measure for a worker’s capability in the task. Next, workers participated in a 3 minute dyadic ROT. 
In this second round the number of sliders was used as measure for performance. The worker with 
most finished sliders won the tournament and received a payment of USD 1.00, the other went away 
empty-handed. In case of a tie, the winner was determined randomly. To increase experimental control 
and comparability, ROTs were not live but workers played against historic data from a pre-test. This 
was explained to workers in the instructions. For the ROT, each worker was randomized to either of 
three treatments: no feedback on the performance of the competitor (NF), feedback on the 
performance of the competitor in a ROT with a strong competitor (FS), and feedback on the 
performance of the competitor in a ROT with a weak competitor (FW). The weak competitor always 
finished 27 sliders while the strong competitor finished 66 sliders. Feedback was measured binary 
whether it was shown (FW and FS) or not (NF). Finally, workers answered a questionnaire and 
received their payment for the experiment, i.e. a show-up fee of USD 0.30, a piece rate for completed 
sliders during the measurement of their capability plus potentially USD 1.00 for winning the ROT. 
Figure 2 illustrates the task and the feedback: The left hand side shows an example with feedback 
(either FS or FW). At any time during the ROT the worker sees his own performance so far (here 7 
completed sliders), his competitor’s performance so far (here 14 completed sliders), and the next slider 
to set to 50. In addition, the screen had a timer and a quit button. The right hand side of Figure 2 
exemplifies the NF treatment; it is identical except that feedback on the competitor’s performance is 
missing – it is only disclosed after the ROT when the result is shown. 
Figure 2. Experiment interface: Live feedback (left image), no feedback (right image) 
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4 Experiment Results 
Overall, 257 workers participated. Table 1 shows summary statistics by treatment. As expected, given 
random assignment to treatments, there is no significant treatment difference in age (ANOVA, p-value 
= 0.752), gender (2 test, p-value = 0.97), or average duration of the experiment (ANOVA, p-value = 
0.388). Differences between average payment were observed (ANOVA, p-value = 0.001). This is 
given by experiment design: In FW, the competitor was weak, in FS he was strong. Thus, the rate of 
workers winning differs. In NF, the rate of weak and strong competitors was equal to the union of FS 
and FW. In piece rate payment, there is no significant treatment difference in the number of finished 
sliders per minute, i.e. in workers capability (ANOVA, p-value = 0.632). We conclude that subjects 
are relatively homogenous across treatments and any performance difference in the ROT is a causal 
effect of the experimental control over the feedback provided and the competitors’ strength. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by treatment 
We first look at the performance of workers under piece rate payment and in the ROT. We use the 
number of finished sliders per minute as performance measure. Aggregated over all treatments, 
performance increased from 11.64 sliders per minute under piece rate payment, to 13.86 sliders per 
minute in the tournament. The effect is significantly greater than zero (mean difference 2.22; t-value = 
-5.511; p-value = 0.001). This is in line with the findings of van Dijk et al. (2001). The effect size is 
medium (Cohen’s d = 0.487). It will depend on the application scenario whether such a medium 
performance increase justifies the extra burden of setting up and communicating a ROT among 
workers. This result should, however, be interpreted cautiously, as it might be confounded by order 
effects. Experience and fatigue could corrupt the measurement. Controlling this by balancing the order 
of incentive schemes was not focus of the experiment. 
The moderated mediation model outlined in the previous section is evaluated with a set of 4 
regressions, following the general steps from Hayes (2009) contemporary interpretation of Baron and 
Kenny’s (1986) mediation and moderation analysis. We first establish the correlation of the causal 
variables on the mediator (regression models 1 and 2) and then estimate the effect of causal variables 
and the mediator on the outcomes variable (regression models 3 and 4). Task Completion is binary (1 
= completed, 0 otherwise), so is strength of competitor (weak or strong). In our setting, the statistical 
consideration of moderation differs from the conventional approach: Conventionally, feedback 
moderating the effect of strength of competitors would be modeled by two direct effects (one from 
feedback, one from strength of competitors) and the interaction of these effects. In our model and 
experiment, strength of competitors is, however, not meaningfully defined in the absence of feedback. 
Without feedback, strength of competitors cannot affect either task completion or performance. Thus, 
moderation here results in three combinations: No feedback (irrespective of strength of competitors), 
feedback and a weak competitor, and feedback and strong competitor. Table 2 provides the results. 
 Treatment  
 NF FW FS All 
Number of participants 97 80 80 257 
Age in years  
(mean, 95% CI) 
31.08 
[29.53, 32.63] 
31.02 
[29.61, 32.44] 
30.05 
[28.61, 31.49] 
30.74 
[29.89, 31.60] 
Share female 40.21% 40.00% 41.25% 40.47% 
Duration in minutes  
(mean, 95% CI) 
8.64 
[7.93, 9.35] 
8.48 
[8.00, 8.97] 
7.87 
[7.46, 8.28] 
8.35 
[8.02, 8.69] 
Payment is USD  
(mean, 95% CI) 
0.95 
[0.87, 1.02] 
1.34 
[1.28, 1.40] 
0.49 
[0.46, 0.51] 
0.93 
[0.88, 0.97] 
Sliders per minute in piece rate  
(mean, 95% CI) 
11.41 
[10.50, 12.32] 
12.03 
[10.97, 13.10] 
11.53 
[10.62, 12.45] 
11.64 
[11.09, 12.19] 
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Table 2. Regression results (Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘+’ 0.1). 
As expected, capability substantially and significantly affects task completion (regression model 1; 
support for H1). No feedback is a dummy equal to 1 for NF treatment and 0 for FW and FS and is the 
negation of feedback. The interaction of strength of competitor and feedback assesses the moderation. 
When competition is weak, and feedback is shown it has no significant effect on task completion 
compared to no feedback. On the contrary, when facing a strong competitor, it has a significant 
negative effect on task completion. With a strong competitor, feedback makes workers quit work. The 
difference between a weak and a strong competitor is significant (regression model 2, significant 
effect of a strong competitor interacted with feedback). Thus, feedback moderates the effect of 
strength of competitors on task completion (support for H6) and when it has an effect on task 
completion, it is negative (support for H4). 
Result 1. Individual capability positively influences task completion. 
Result 2. Strong competitors negatively influence task completion when feedback is given; it does not 
influence task completion when strength of competitors is weak. 
After establishing the effects on the mediator task completion, we now turn to the effects on the 
outcome. The results of ordinary least squares regressions (OLS) are depicted in columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 2. Task completion has, as expected (H3), a significant positive effect on performance. 
Workers who complete a task finish more sliders correctly. Capability has a significant direct positive 
effect on performance (support for H2). People who are capable of doing the task perform better than 
those who are not. We conclude that the effect of capability on performance is partially mediated by 
task completion. The more capable a worker is the more likely he will complete the task which will 
result in a better performance. Furthermore the direct effect of being more capable and as a result 
perform better does not vanish completely through a mediation of task completion. When feedback is 
given, a weak competitor has a significant negative effect on performance compared to no feedback. It 
seems that indeed frontrunners lay back when they know that they are frontrunners. When facing a 
strong competitor and feedback is given, on the contrary, leads to no different performance than no 
feedback (regression model 3). The difference between a weak and a strong competitor is significant 
(regression model 4). As hypothesized, we find a moderating effect of feedback on the effect of 
strength of competitors on performance. Our hypothesis H5 is, however, only partially supported: as 
expected, with given feedback, playing against a weak competitor decreases performance; contrary to 
our expectation, when playing against a strong competitor feedback does not increase performance. 
These effects are not influenced by fatigue of workers who play longer than those who quit the task, 
since we control for task completion in our regressions. 
Result 3. Individual capability positively influences performance. The effect is partially mediated by 
task completion. 
Result 4. Strength of competitors negatively influences performance. When feedback is given, there 
is a direct, unmediated negative effect of weak competitors on performance. With strong 
competitors, the negative effect on performance is fully mediated by task completion. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Task Completion  Task Completion  Performance  Performance  
Estimation method Logit Logit OLS OLS 
Task Completion     21.399 *** 21.399  *** 
Capability  0.109 ** 0.109 ** 1.339 *** 1.339  *** 
No Feedback   0.260  
 
  -0.771 
 
Weak Competitor x Feedback -0.260 
 
  -2.348 * -3.119  * 
Strong Competitor x Feedback -1.537 * -1.277  * 0.771  
 
 
Intercept 1.546 * 1.286 + -1.044 
 
-0.273 
 
N 257  257  257  257  
R2 (Cragg and Uhler's R2 for logit) 0.164  0.164  0.689  0.689  
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5 Conclusions and Further Research 
The relationship between financial incentive schemes, performance feedback, and worker 
performance, has gained new relevance with the omnipresence of online labor markets and 
crowdsourcing of freelancers. In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between a specific 
incentive design (ROT) and task performance in an anonymous crowd labor market. We hypothesized 
a moderated mediation model on the determinants of worker performance in ROTs and tested it 
experimentally in an online labor market. In ROTs, individual capability positively influences 
performance; the effect is partially mediated by task completion. We find that strength of competitors 
negatively influences performance when feedback about the performance is given. For individual 
workers, feedback that they are performing comparatively well does not affect their tendency to 
complete the task but tends to reduce their performance. Potentially as feedback signals that the 
worker does not have to excel to win the competition, or it signals that low performance is the norm, 
or both. In cases where feedback shows a worker that he is far behind, it increases the tendency of the 
worker to quit the task. Underlying reasons could be that the worker knows that winning the 
competition (and hence the financial reward) is unlikely and he cuts his losses in terms of time 
invested or that he aims to work on tasks where he has a comparative advantage over other workers. 
Performance of workers who obtain the feedback that they are comparatively weak but who 
nevertheless continue to work on a task, do not change their effort compared to receiving no feedback. 
Overall, the contribution of this paper is threefold: it summarizes the existing evidence on incentives 
and feedback on performance in a theoretical model, it tests the hypothesized effects experimentally, 
and it demonstrates the validity in the context of crowd labor markets. The limitations of the present 
work are straightforward and include the following: First, we only explore strong and weak 
competitors but no mediocre competitors. Expanding the analysis in this direction might show that 
moderation of the effect of strength of competitors on performance by feedback is non-linear. Second, 
with the slider task we explore a rather unnatural setting. In order to increase external validity, the next 
step is to explore tasks more common to crowd work and to camouflage the experimental context. 
Furthermore even though we tried to exclude intrinsic motivation as much as possible, it still might 
play a role for some workers, which should be analyzed in future research. At present, our results have 
implications for designing feedback schemes in crowd work environments. First off, feedback of a 
ROT demotivates the lower and upper part of the population. One way to avoid that might be to 
provide feedback only to selected participants. As a direction for future research, it seems fruitful to 
develop adaptive feedback systems that provide feedback only if the participant will in expectation act 
positively on it. In addition, future work should disentangle the effects of social norms and financial 
incentives on worker performance. 
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